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Abstract  In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply 
chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer selling its product to the consumer only 
through competing duopolistic retailers. We consider a new form of the demand function 
which is an additive form. The demand is influenced by both retail price and advertising 
expenditures. To identify optimal advertising and pricing decisions, we discuss three possible 
games (two non cooperative games including Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-
Collusion, and one cooperative game) and then we compare the various decision variables and 
the profits for all cases and also with similar results of the existing literature to develop some 
important insights.  
Keywords: game theory, supply chain, pricing, advertising, cooperative advertising, retail 
competition, retail cooperation, cooperation. 
JEL Classifications: C7, M3 
1. Introduction 
Cooperative advertising is one of the most important issues in marketing programs and plays 
a significant role in the analysis of supply chain relationships. It is defined as an interactive 
relationship and financial arrangement between the members of supply chain, in which the 
manufacturer shares a part of the retailer’s advertising expenditures - commonly known as the 
manufacture’s participation rate - to motivate immediate sales at the retail level. The supply 
chain members have different advertising objectives. The manufacturer invests in national 
advertising in order to build brand equity and to promote and lure the potential consumers 
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choosing its product. Whereas, the retailer invests in local advertising in order to boost the 
local demand.  
Reviewing the literature developed by several researchers, one can find that the most widely 
effective tool used to analyze the cooperative advertising is the game theory. The latter is a 
mathematical method for modeling strategic decision making between two or more players. 
Game theory is divided in two branches: non cooperative and cooperative. A game is non 
cooperative if each player makes decisions independently and only interest is to maximize its 
own payoff irrespective of the other player’s profit. A game is cooperative if all players wish 
to be one person and making decisions together in order to optimize the total sum of the 
individual profit.  
Additionally, the literature review focused on static models of cooperative advertising can be 
divided into two main parts. A literature deals with the classical supply chain consisting of 
one manufacturer – one retailer and a literature deals with the supply chain formed by 
multiple manufactures – multiple retailers.  
For the first part, the work of Berger (1972) was the first paper modeling mathematically the 
cooperative advertising as discount on the wholesale price given by a manufacturer to retailer. 
The consumer demand is a concave function of the level of advertising. He concluded that 
using cooperative advertising can make higher profits and both the manufacturer and the 
retailer can be better off from it. Following this research, several authors have addressed this 
concept by different point of view (see,e. g., Berger (1973); Crimmins (1985); Roslow, 
Laskey, and Nicholls (1993); Berger and Magliozzi (1992); Dant and Berger (1996); kim and 
Staelin (1999); Xie & Ai (2005); Nagler (2006)…). 
Huang and Li (2001) studied the vertical cooperative advertising issue under a non-linear 
demand function which depends both on the local and the national advertising expenditures. 
This work was the first that compares the different type of manufacturer-retailer interactions 
by game theory. The authors identified best Pareto efficient sharing schemes by taking 
channel members’ risk attitudes into account. They observed that the manufacturer always 
prefers the Stackelberg game to the simultaneous move game whereas the preference of the 
retailer depends on the parameters of the model. See also Li et al. (2002), Huang et al. (2002) 
and Huang and Li (2005) for similar approaches but with slightly different demand functions. 
 
Yue et al. (2006) investigated the coordination of cooperative advertising when the 
manufacturer provides a price deduction directly to consumers.  Also, their approach focused 
on the problem of negative Huang and Li (2001) demand function under certain values of the 
decisions variables.  
 
Szamerkovsky and Zhang (2009) developed a supply chain formed by one manufacturer one 
retailer where demand is influenced by both retail price and advertising and obtained 
Stackelberg manufacturer equilibrium.  
Xie and Wei (2009) consider that the demand function is dependent of retail price effect and 
advertising effect. The authors develop two game theoretic models to identify the optimal 
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equilibrium pricing and cooperative advertising policies. They determine a close-form optimal 
solution in both Stackelberg game and cooperative game and compare them. They conclude 
that the profit and advertising efforts are higher for all channel members and the retail price 
reduces under cooperation. They identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where 
the channel members can determine how to divide the extra-profits generated by cooperation. 
Xie and Neyret (2009) keep the multiplicatively separable form of the demand function of Xie 
and Wei (2009), but they adopted the advertising effect function that proposed by Huang and 
Li (2001). Then, they discussed pricing and cooperative advertising strategies by considering 
three non cooperative games (Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer) and 
one cooperative game. The results of this research do not differ from those found by Xie and 
Wei.  
Further, SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) coordinate pricing and cooperative advertising in one 
manufacturer-one retailer supply chain. In this paper, the authors introduce a slight 
modification in the linear price demand function which is assumed to have a relatively general 
form: they introduce a new parameter   which yields convex        , linear       and 
concave         curves.    
Aust and Buscher (2012) expand the existing research which deals with simple supply chain 
consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The market demand is the multiplication of 
the retail price and advertising investment as the linear function proposed by Xie and Wei 
(2009). In addition, the authors derive the modified price demand function of SeyedEsfahani 
et al. (2011) by introduction a new decision variable (the retailer margin      ). The 
authors apply four forms of retailer-manufacturer relationship on their model (the Nash, the 
Sackelberg-manufacturer, the Stackelberg-retailer and the cooperation) and conclude that the 
profit of the supply chain was the highest when the supply chain members cooperated. Also, 
this situation generates a lowest retail price and highest advertising expenditures.  
 
For the second part, we focus on the literature dealing with competing members in upstream 
and/or downstream of the channel. Among all hitherto existing literature on advertising and 
pricing, a few studies considered a supply channel in which a one manufacturer sells a 
product through two competing retailers. In this context, Wang et al. (2011) consider a market 
demand that only depends on advertising investment. They establish four non cooperative 
games (Stackelberg - Cournot, Stackelberg - Collusion, Nash - Cournot and Nash – collusion) 
and a cooperative game to investigate the impact of various competitive behaviors on the 
cooperative advertising policies and on the profits of all participants. Zhang and Xie (2012) 
follow the similar approach and explore the impact of the retailer’s multiplicity on channel 
members’ optimal decisions and on the total channel efficiency.  
Ben Youssef and Dridi (2013) study a supply channel consisting of monopolistic 
manufacturer and duopolistic retailers where the demand function is influenced by both 
pricing and national advertising. They investigate the problem under three game theoretical 
models including non cooperative game, partial cooperative game and full cooperation game. 
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They propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers’ surplus which positively depends 
not only on the price-demand function but also on the national advertising investment.  
Recently, Aust and Buscher (2014) assumed that the consumer demand simultaneous 
influenced by both retail price and advertising efforts: the demand function was deduced from 
the consumers’ utility function and is a multiplicative form as Xie and Wei (2009) model. The 
authors compare two different types of retailer behavior: retailers acting independently and 
retailers acting in collusion. 
The work of Alirezai and KhoshAllah (2014) is closely related to that of Aust and Busher 
(2012). The authors consider pricing
3
 which splitting into wholesale price and retailer margin 
and cooperative advertising in two-stage supply chain and develop a monopolistic retailer and 
duopolistic retailers’ model. Each member plays the Nash, Manufacturer-Stackelberg and 
cooperative game. They failed to analytically solve the equation for the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price in the Manufacturer-Stackelberg case and the parametric equations in 
cooperation case. This requires the use of numerical example that illustrates the performance 
of the supply chain is improved under the cooperation.  
Lastly, Karray and Amin (2014) evaluate the profitability of cooperative advertising in a 
channel with competing retailers. In this work, the authors proposed the retail price and the 
local advertising expenditures as decision variables of retailers and the coop participation rate 
and the wholesale price as decision variables of manufacturer. But, they ignored the national 
advertising expenditures (decision variable of manufacturer).  They assumed a demand 
function that has been commonly used in the literature by McGuire and Staelin (1983), Choi 
(1991), Karray and Zaccour (2006) and Karray (2013). This demand function is positively 
influenced by his local advertising and negatively affected by the local advertising of his 
competitor. They developed two non-cooperative games (one is without cooperative 
advertising and another is with cooperative advertising) and a cooperative game and provided 
equilibrium solutions for each game.  
 
For more comprehensive review of the literature on advertising in supply chain, one can be 
referred to the articles contributed by Aust and Busher (2014) and by Jorgensen and Zaccour 
(2013).  
The main motivation of our research is to extend the existing research that considered a static 
model of cooperative advertising and pricing in one manufacturer – one retailer supply chain 
by assuming a supply chain with one manufacturer and two retailers which sell the 
manufacturer’s products to final consumers.  To our best knowledge, the researches that 
addressed to study pricing and cooperative advertising at the same time in one manufacturer – 
two retailers supply chain has not been well explored in literature. Furthermore, our paper 
proposes a new additive form of consumer’s demand function that takes into account the 
competitive behavior of the duopolistic retailers in terms of pricing strategies and advertising 
investments. The positive influence of both the own advertising efforts and the competing 
retailer’s advertising makes our contribution unique because no studies related to this issue 
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have been done before. This paper investigates the effects of cooperative advertising 
programs in a supply chain where retailers compete or retailers collude or manufacturer and 
retailers cooperate. Also, it discusses the impact of the retailers’ interaction and cooperation 
on the channel’s decision variables, the demand and the profits. Our model is analyzed under 
three different cases. In the first case, which is a Stackelberg – Cournot game, the 
manufacturer as a leader charges a wholesale price, invests in national advertising and offers 
participation rate. The two retailers as followers charge the retail prices and invest in local 
advertising (retail competition). The second case is a Stackelberg – Collusion game, the 
manufacturer’s behavior remains unmodified, while the two retailers collude and work 
together (retail coalition). In the third case, all supply chain members agree to make their 
decision together by maximizing the total profit which is the sum of the manufacture’s and 
retailers’ profits. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in section  , we present the basic model and the assumptions 
required for our work, while in section  ; three game models of one manufacturer – two 
retailers relationship are described. In section  , we compare and discuss our results obtained. 
Finally, in section  , we present the conclusions of our work, followed by a description of 
future researches.   
2. The basic model 
  
In this paper, we consider a supply chain consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer selling its 
product to the consumer only through two duopolistic retailers. The manufacturer announces 
his wholesale price and each retailer decides on the retail price. In order to improve sales, the 
manufacturer invests in national advertising while the two retailers invest in local advertising. 
In addition to the national advertising investment and the wholesale price, the manufacturer 
agrees to share with the duopolistic retailers the same fraction of total local advertising 
expenditures, which is the manufacturer’s co-op advertising reimbursement policy, to boost 
the local demand. 
Unlike the existing research related to this issue that mainly focused on channel members’ 
advertising decisions and adopted a multiplicatively separable demand function, our paper 
presents a supply chain model with duopolistic retailers’ different competitive behaviors by 
adopting an additive form of demand function and taking pricing decisions into account. We 
assume the expected demand function, often called the sales response function, to be 
determined by the retail price, local advertising expenditures, and national advertising 
expenditures. As in Lal (1990) and in Wang et al. (2009), we assume that the demand depends 
positively on own advertising investments and on rival’s advertising. So, we define the 
following demand function    of retailer  , as, 
                                                             
 
where    is a positive constant and denotes the maximal potential demand faced by retailer   if 
prices and advertising expenditures are zero; 
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  is a positive parameter that denotes the price competition level between retailers and should 
not be higher than a retailer’s own price (   ). 
 
   (  ) is the sale price charged by retailer       to consumer; 
   is the local advertising expenditure of retailer  ; 
  is the advertising competition effect; 
  is the manufacturer’s national advertising expenditures.  
The demand function of each retailer   decreases with the retailer’s own price and increases 
with the competing retailer’s price, with the own advertising and with the competing retailer’s 
advertising. 
According to the notation explained above, the retailer i’s and the manufacturer’s profits are 
expressed as follows, respectively
4
: 
                     
  
 
    
                  
    
       
 
So, the sum of the retailers’ profit and the total channel’s profit are determined 
respectively as follows: 
 
    
           
 
    
              
 
    
  is the manufacturer’s wholesale price        ; 
  is the manufacturer's participation rate in retailers’ local advertising expenditures      
  .  
The wholesale price and the participation rate are assumed to be equal for both retailers 
because of a legislation constraint by the Robinson–Patman act of 1936 (or Anti-Price 
Discrimination Act) that is a United States federal law that prohibits unjust discrimination. In 
addition, we want to treat them in the same manner
5
.  
 Without loss of generality, we normalize the    to  . 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Wang et al. (2009) note that the advertising expenditures are quadratic as incremental investments in brand-
specific service become increasingly costly and note also that assuming cost     
 is equivalent to assuming 
diminishing returns to advertising effort      in Eq. (1). It is the same for the national advertising. 
5 Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526, codified at 15 U.S.C. §13.  
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3. Three game models of one manufacturer- two retailers relationship 
In this section, we discuss three game-theoretic models based on two non-cooperative games 
including Stackelberg-Cournot and Stackelberg-Collusion with one cooperative. In the 
Stackelberg game setting, the manufacturer acts as a leader by declaring the wholesale price, 
the level of national advertising investment and the participation rate of local advertising 
expenditures (first stage). Then, the duopolistic retailers behave like followers and make the 
decision about the retail prices and the level local advertising costs after the manufacturer’s 
revelation of co-op advertising policy (second stage). In the cooperative game setting, the 
members of the supply chain coordinate their decisions in order to optimize the overall profit 
of the supply chain. 
In the next subsections, we will analyze the supply chain by game theoretic approach and will 
discuss how each member of the supply chain determines its sale price and advertising policy. 
3.1. The Stackelberg - Cournot game 
In this situation, we model the relationship between the manufacturer and the two retailers as 
a sequential (two stage) non-cooperative game where the manufacturer, as the leader, first 
specifies its strategy. The retailers, as the followers, then make decisions 
simultaneously and independently (they play a Nash game). 
The solution of this game is called the Stackelberg equilibrium. In order to determine this 
solution, we use a backward procedure that allows solving first the followers’ decision 
problem to get the response functions (of the leader’s decisions) of retail prices and local 
advertising expenditures. We then find the optimal the manufacturer's optimal decision 
variables based on the best responses of the duopolistic retailers. 
So, the decision problem of retailer   is as follows: 
                                           
  
 
                              
 
    
 
 
To identify the best response functions, we will compute the first-order derivatives of the 
retailers’ decision problem when the manufacturer’s decision variables are considered 
exogenous and then set them to zero. Therefore, we can obtain the results: 
 
    
   
                           
    
    
   
                 
    
 
Solving these equations yields to the following retailers’ decision variables: 
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After knowing the retailers’ pricing strategy and advertising policy, the manufacturer chooses 
its proper wholesale price, national advertising level and local advertising participation rate. 
For this reason, we substitute equations     and      into     to obtain the manufacturer 
profit function. Therefore, the manufacturer’s decision problem can be rewritten as shown 
below: 
      
                   
             
 
              
 
                
    
 
                   
 
 
     
 
   is a concave function of manufacturer’s decision variables, its reaction functions can be 
derived from the three first-order derivatives of Eq.     . 
 
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
     
 
 
Which are expressed as (after substitution): 
  
             
                 
 
 
     
 
  
                              
                       
 
 
     
 
  
        
                       
 
 
     
 
Proposition  : the Stackelberg-Cournot game previously described has the following unique 
equilibrium solution
6
: 
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All the decision variables depend on the level of both the competitor’s price   and 
competitor’s advertising  . In the Stackelberg-Cournot game, the manufacturer invests more 
on advertising than the duopolistic retailers. Proposition 1 reveals that the manufacturer is 
disposed to share the cost of local advertising. Fig.   illustrates the function of        . We 
can easily perceive that the highest participation rate will be achieved for the maximum 
values of   and  . Also, if     and    ,   will be equal to    . The shape of the curve 
shows that the price competition effect has more influence on the participation rate than the 
advertising competition effect.    
 
 
3.2. The Stackelberg - Collusion game 
In this subsection, we model the relationship between the monopolistic manufacturer and the 
duopolistic retailers as a leader-followers game. The manufacturer is still the leader, while the 
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two retailers decide to collude because they want to maximize the joint profit that is, the sum 
of their profits (see Eq.    ). We hence have the following profit function: 
 
                                     
                   
                         
                                                                                               
To maximize this joint profit function, one can easily solve the retailers’ decision problem by 
equating the four first-order derivatives to zero and taking into account the exogeneity of the 
manufacturer's decision variables. 
   
   
                                
 
     
 
   
   
                         
 
     
 
From the equations presented above, we have the optimal solutions of the retail price and the 
local advertising as shown: 
      
                                  
                 
 
 
     
 
      
               
                 
 
 
     
 
The manufacturer, as a leader, knows the retailers’ reaction functions given in      and      
before setting  ,  ,  . So, the manufacturer’s profits function for any  ,   and   can be 
formulated by substituting      and      into     as: 
 
   
                           
                  
   
 
                      
                    
    
 
 
 
 
     
 
Solving 
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
   leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition  : The Stackelberg equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg-Collusion game is 
unique and is given by: 
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Under the Stackelberg-collusion game, we observe that the manufacturer determines its 
participation rate for the retailers’ local advertising costs independently of parameters   and 
 .  
3.3.The cooperation game 
The previous two subsections analyzed two non-cooperative game structures. We now focus 
on the cooperative game structure in which the monopolistic manufacturer and the two 
duopolistic retailers agree to cooperate and they make their decisions together to determine 
the retail price and the local/national advertising investment. The aim of this cooperation is to 
improve their profitability and to achieve the optimal pricing and advertising policies by 
maximizing the entire profit of the whole supply chain together (Eq    ). That is: 
         
                        
                   
  
 
   
     
 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
     
We remark that the objective function does not depend on the wholesale price and the 
participation rate of local advertising. However, the individual profit of each supply chain 
member is dependent of these variables. To solve this optimization problem, we determine the 
first-order derivatives of      by taking with respect to   ,    and  , respectively, and then 
equate them to zero as follows: 
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From     ,      and     , we derive the following proposition: 
Proposition  : The equilibrium solution of Cooperation game between a monopolistic 
manufacturer and duopolistic retailers is unique and is as follows: 
   
 
          
 
 
     
  
   
          
 
 
     
   
 
          
 
     
 
Regardless from the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailers, the manufacturer, 
as a leader, spends more on advertising than the retailers (the followers). 
4. The results and discussion 
In this section, we compare our results obtained and discuss them. 
4.1. Comparison of results 
Before discussing the results, we summarize the equilibrium solutions obtained for each game 
in Table  . Then, we compare between them.  
Table  : Optimal expressions in each game 
 
  
Stackelberg - Cournot 
 
 
Stackelberg - Collusion 
 
Cooperation 
 
  
 
        
                       
 
 
 
             
                             
 
 
_________ 
 
  
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________ 
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Due to the difficulty of comparison, we use the following figures. In the figures    ,    ,    , 
    and    , we evaluate the effect of retailers' behavior on the manufacture’s and retailers’ 
decision variables by comparing the equilibrium solution of both the Stackelberg-Cournot 
game (retail competition) and the Stackelberg-Collusion game (retail cooperation). In the 
figures    ,     and    , we compare the equilibrium solutions of the three games in order to 
determine the impact of cooperation between all the supply chain members on the decisions 
variables. The areas shaded in red, blue and green shown in the schemas correspond, 
respectively, to the Stackelberg-Cournot game, the Stackelberg-Collusion game and the 
cooperation game.  As shown in the appendix, the second order conditions require us to 
choose the intervals of the competitor’s price ( ) and the competitor’s advertising ( ) to 
ensure that the solutions of each variable are maximums. For this reason, we consider that 
          and           .        
 
 
 
 14 
 
  
  
 15 
 
  
 
Each figure of    ,    ,    ,     and     indicates the sets of the parameters      , for which 
a retail competition leads to higher or lower decision variable than a retail cooperation.  
For higher levels of the competitor’s advertising         , the manufacturer increases 
her/his wholesale price if the retailers work together whatever the level of the competitor’s 
price            . Also, it can be seen in the Fig.    that the highest wholesale price occurs 
at the Stackelberg - Cournot whereas the lowest occurs at the Stackelberg – Collusion if the 
level of competitor’s advertising is low           and the level of competitor’s price is very 
high         . If   and   are very low                          . And if   
is too low and   is low                          .  
From Fig.   , we notice that the manufacturer’s participation rate in retailers’ local 
advertising expenditures is higher in the retail competition than when the duopolistic retailers 
agree to act jointly in pricing and local advertising. This result is interesting and surprised us 
because it is different from that found by Wang et al. (2011). The latter found that the 
participation rate is higher, under certain condition, in the Stackelberg - Collusion. Otherwise 
they will be equal to zero. In addition, empirical studies of Dutta et al (1995) and Nagler 
(2006) reveal that the most common participation rate was anywhere between      to       
and most manufacturers set the participation rate arbitrarily and without detailed analysis. 
However, we prove in this research that the manufacturer’s participation in the local 
advertising expenditures is between      and    . 
We remind that the cooperation game is not included in the figures     and     because the 
optimal solutions of  and   are not determined in this situation. 
Under the retail cooperation,  Fig.    indicates that the manufacturer invests more in 
advertising if the level of competitor’s advertising is higher than      regardless of the level 
of competitor’s price        . 
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If       ,  the level of the competitor’s price determines for which a retail competition 
leads to higher or lower manufacturer’s advertising expenditures than a retail cooperation. For 
example:                    
                              
                                   
   
Fig.    illustrates that  the manufacture’s advertising expenditures increases when the supply 
chain members engage in a cooperative program.  
When the duopolistic retailers compete, they advertise less than the level desired by the 
manufacturer (Fig.   ). For this reason, the manufacturer provides a part of the retailers’ 
advertising costs between     and     to boost sales of their product at local level.    
When the duopolistic retailers cooperate, the manufacturer sets the participation rate at     
regardless of the level of both competitor’s price and competitor’s advertising which requires 
the two retailers to invest more in advertising.  
                               
                   
                    
                     
  
Fig.    shows that each retailer’s advertising is higher in the cooperation game than in the 
Stackelberg-Cournot game or  in the Stackelberg-Colluson game.  
As shown in Fig.   , the retail cooperation leads to higher retail price if the degree of the 
competitor’s advertising surpass       (for any value of the competitor’s price), while, the 
retail competition yields the lowest price. 
 If the competitor’s advertising is less than      , the highest retail price depends on the set of 
the competitor’s price ( ). If   located in the red area (respectively the blue area), the highest 
retail price arises from the competition behavior amongst the two retailers (respectively the 
cooperative behavior amongst the two retailers).  
 From Fig.   , the highest retail price can be found in the cooperation. So, this result is very 
important because Ben Youssef and Dridi (2013) shown that the lowest retail price results 
from the cooperation 
Next, we will determine the demand function, the profit of each supply chain member and the 
overall profit of the system of the three games in Table  . 
Table  : Demand function and profits 
  
Stackelberg-Cournot 
 
 
Stackelberg-
Collusion 
 
Cooperation 
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We will analyze the demands and the profit resulting for each channel member as well as the 
total profit. Fig.     and Fig.     illustrate that the highest demand of each channel member7 
is received under collusion in retail markets if        (for any value of  ).  
If         the figures reveal two regions. For example, 
                   
                 
            
      
                
            
      
  
As we mentioned earlier that the retail price increases under a Cooperation strategy, the 
retailers’ demand does not decrease (Fig.    ). So, an increase in retail price does not 
necessarily lead to a decrease in sales. This is largely explained by spending more money on 
national and local advertising. As visible from Fig.    , the highest manufacturer’s demand 
results when the manufacturer and the two retailers cooperate.  
Fig.     and Fig.     reveal that the manufacturer, as a leader, prefers that the duopolistic 
retailers collude and maximize their joint profit. However, the two retailers prefer acting 
simultaneously and separately because they gain more profits under this situation. For a very 
high value of the competitor’s price and a very low value of the competitor’s advertising, each 
channel member gain more profits under the Stackelberg-Cournot game rather than under the 
Stackelberg-Collusion game. In contrast, for a very low value of the competitor’s price and a 
very high value of the competitor’s advertising, each channel member receives higher profits 
when the duopolistic retailers cooperate compared to the competing retailers’ situation. 
Fig.     and Fig.     show our results for the total profit. In Fig.    , the highest total profit 
of the supply chain results from the Stackelberg-Cournot game (Stackelberg-Collusion game) 
if the parameters set in the red area (the blue area). Fig.     is consistent with the well-known 
result of the literature: for every set of the parameters   and  , the supply chain members 
                                                          
7
 We remind that   is the retailer’s demand and        is the manufacturer’s demand. 
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agree to take decisions together (to cooperate) in order to maximize the entire channel’s profit 
only if they cannot get any higher profits in any other strategies.  
5. Conclusions 
The current paper extends the existing studies of cooperative advertising that mainly focus on 
supply chain with one manufacturer-one retailer by adding a competition between retailers. 
Furthermore, only few studies to date have developed a supply chain consisting of one 
manufacturer and two retailers and have not taken into account the pricing decisions directly. 
To fill this gap, our paper investigates the pricing policies and the advertising strategies for 
one manufacturer - two retailers supply chain and we assume that the demand function is an 
additive form which is influenced by both retail price and advertising expenditures. By means 
of game theory, we consider three different scenarios between the supply chain members:     
the manufacturer, as a leader, specifies its strategy. Then the two retailers, as the followers, 
make decisions simultaneously and independently;     the manufacturer is still the leader, 
while the two retailers decide to cooperate in order to maximize the sum of their profits;     
all the channel members cooperate and make decisions together to improve their profitability 
by maximizing the total profit of the whole supply chain. 
 
Based on the analysis of these relationships, we find the following insights:     All the 
decision variables (except   ) and the demand and the profits functions depend on the level of 
both the competitor’s price   and competitor’s advertising  . The sets of these parameters 
(          and           ) indicate for which a retail competition leads to higher or 
lower decision variables (the wholesale and retail prices and the manufacturer’s and retailer’s 
advertising expenditures) and demand than a retail cooperation. For a very higher value of   
(for a very low value of  ) and a very low value of   (a very high value of  ), the highest 
variables are received when the two duopolistic retailers compete (the two duopolistic 
retailers cooperate). Additionally, the manufacturer, as a leader, prefers that the duopolistic 
retailers collude and maximize their joint profit. However, the two retailers prefer acting 
simultaneously and separately because they gain more profits under this situation.     The 
manufacturer’s participation rate in retailers’ local advertising expenditures is higher in the 
retail competition than when the duopolistic retailers agree to act jointly. In the contrast to 
previous studies which reveal that the most common participation rate is chosen arbitrarily 
and was anywhere between      to     , our research prove that the manufacturer’s 
participation in the local advertising expenditures does not exceed     (between      and 
   .).     The cooperation between all the members of supply chain generated the highest 
wholesale and retail prices, the highest local and national advertising expenditures, the highest 
demand of each member and the highest total profits compared to the other scenarios.  Our 
research demonstrates that despite the increase in retail price, but the demand rose. This 
situation is harmful to consumer and puts him in a worse position. While, the previous 
researches proved that the cooperation is characterized by a lowest retail price.   
The study of cooperative advertising and pricing in supply chain using game theory is an 
interesting and meaningful area. There are many other directions of research that can be 
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pursued. For example, our investigation on one manufacturer – two retailers supply chain can 
be extended to two manufacturers – two retailers. It will be interesting to adopt another form 
of demand function or adding another coordination instrument that may yield different results. 
Finally, we may continue our research by using a simultaneous move game (Nash - Cournot, 
Nash - Collusion), shifting the leading power from manufacturers to retailers or assuming 
collusion between a manufacturer and retailer. 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of proposition 1.  
 The first partial derivatives of the profit function of each retailer are: 
   
 
 
                   
   
 
 
 
    
   
 
To proof the optimality of the solutions of retailer  , we calculate the Hessian matrix: 
  
 
 
 
     
   
 
     
      
     
      
     
   
 
 
 
 
 
The second order partial derivatives are as follows: 
     
   
                                  
     
   
                                
     
      
    
The first principal minor of   is negative (  ).  
The second principal minor of   is:    
     
   
  
     
   
   
     
      
           is positive if 
     .  
The principal minors have alternating algebraic signs, which means that the profit function of 
each retailer     is concave at the solution   
     , which is a local maximum. 
 The second order partial derivatives of formula      with respect to  ,   and   are: 
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To proof the optimality of the solutions of manufacturer, we have the following Hessian 
matrix: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
The first principal minor of   is    
    
   
 and is negative.  
The second principal minor of   is 
    
                               
                                                  
 and is positive if   
                          8.  
The third principal minor of   is 
    
            
                                                 
 is negative if   
                                9.  
So, the manufacturer’s profit function    is concave at the solution   
        , which is a 
local maximum. 
Proof of proposition 2.  
 The first partial derivatives of the joint retailers’ profit function  
   
   
 
   
   
  are the 
following expressions: 
                                                          
8
       :   is a function of   when the second principal minor 
  equate to zero. 
9
       :   is a function of   when the third principal minor 
  equate to zero. 
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After substitution and algebraic simplification, we obtain equation      and equation     . 
To proof the optimality of the solutions of two retailers, we calculate the following Hessian 
matrix: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
    
    
      
  
    
      
   
    
      
 
    
      
  
    
   
     
    
      
     
    
      
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
   
     
    
      
 
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
      
   
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first principal minor of   is       is negative.  
The second principal minor of   is          and is positive for all        .  
The third principal minor of   is        
  
 
     
  
 
   and is negative if   
                                10.  
The fourth principal minor of   is    
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
      and is positive if 
                                   11.  
So, the principal minors of   have alternating algebraic signs at the solution        . This 
means that   is negative definite and the profit of both retailers    is concave at this solution, 
which is a local maximum.  
To proof the optimality of the solutions of manufacturer under the Stackelberg-Collusion 
game, we calculate the Hessian matrix as shown in proof of proposition   and we found: 
The first principal minor of   is     
        
              
   is negative.  
The second principal minor of   is    
                                         
                               
 and is 
positive if                                     12.  
                                                          
10
       :   is a function of   when the third principal minor 
  equate to zero. 
11
       :   is a function of   when the fourth principal minor  
  equate to zero. 
12
       :   is a function of   when the second principal minor 
  equate to zero. 
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The third principal minor of   is    
                 
                              
 and is negative if 
                                    13.  
So, the principal minors of   have alternating algebraic signs at the solution         . This 
means that   is negative definite and the profit of manufacturer    is concave at this 
solution, which is a local maximum. 
Proof of proposition 3. To proof the optimality of the solutions of supply chain members, we 
calculate the following Hessian matrix of the total channel’s profit: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
    
    
      
  
    
      
   
    
      
   
    
     
 
    
      
  
    
   
     
    
      
     
    
      
   
    
     
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
   
     
    
      
   
    
     
 
    
      
   
    
      
    
    
      
   
    
   
    
    
     
    
     
    
    
     
   
    
     
   
    
     
   
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first principal minor of   is       is negative. 
The second principal minor of   is          and is positive for all        . 
The third principal minor of   is                   and is negative if   
                                14. 
The fourth principal minor of   is                        and is positive if 
                                  15. 
The fifth principal minor of   is                                 and 
is negative if                                     16.  
So, the principal minors of   have alternating algebraic signs and the matrix is negative 
definite at the cooperative solution         . This means that there exist a unique solution and 
is a local maximum.  
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